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Abstract
Institutional theory emphasizes the institutional constraints that render radical innovations illegitimate, but 
fails to explain how such innovations might succeed. Adopting a micro-institutional perspective, this paper 
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companies, we develop an empirically grounded theory of the institutional work through which proponents 
legitimize radical innovations within established firms. This theory describes a variety of micro-institutional 
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by explaining embedded agents’ use of a range of options to pursue radical innovation, providing a robust 
explanation of both institutional stability and radical change.
Keywords
embedded agency, institutional entrepreneurship, institutional work, legitimacy, radical innovation, strategic 
responses
Corresponding author:
Hans Berends, Eindhoven University of Technology, School of Industrial Engineering, P.O. Box 513 – 5600 MB – Eindhoven, 
the Netherlands. 
Email: j.j.berends@tue.nl
421253OSSXXX10.1177/0170840611421253Van Dijk et al.Organization Studies
1486 Organization Studies 32(11) 
Introduction
Institutional theory argues that social and economic action is governed, enabled and constrained by 
widely shared regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive conventions, creating stability and sim-
ilarity (Scott, 2001). Over the years, research has shifted attention from the stabilizing effects of 
institutions to agency and institutional change, by investigating strategic responses to institutional 
pressures (Oliver, 1991), institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988) and institutional work 
(Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). This work raises the issue of embedded agency (Seo & Creed, 
2002): How is novel strategic action within institutions possible when actors are constrained by 
those institutions? Some institutional conditions, such as institutional contradictions, afford critical 
resources for strategic action (e.g. Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002). But such 
institutional conditions have not yet been systematically related to repertoires of strategic action; 
furthermore, this prior work on such conditions is largely limited to the macro-level of institutional 
fields (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009, p. 285). In this paper we instead explore 
embedded agency within the micro-institutional context of established firms, thereby building 
upon the growing number of micro-level studies of institutional work (e.g., Jarzabkowski et al., 
2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).
Radical innovation provides an exemplary setting to investigate embedded agency, because it is 
incommensurate with existing institutional logics. Radical technological innovation involves new 
products, novel technologies and novel application areas or market segments (Gatignon, Tushman, 
Smith, & Anderson, 2002; Leifer et al., 2000), thus violating prevailing practices and contradicting 
institutionalized expectations about what is real, appropriate and beneficial to the organization 
(e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Garud & Rappa, 1994). Institutional forces 
constrain innovators in established companies to what is legitimate within existing institutional 
logics and structures, thereby inhibiting radical innovation (see Christensen, 1993; Dougherty, 
1992; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Yet successful radical innovations do occur within established 
firms (Leifer et al., 2000). Dougherty and Heller (1994) observed that strategic actions may over-
come problems of illegitimacy, but they did not explain how strategic responses emerge within 
restrictive institutional structures. Hence we investigate how actors exploit micro-institutional con-
ditions within firms in their strategic responses to legitimacy crises.
We approach this question through qualitative studies of radical technological innovation trajec-
tories in two established high-tech companies, in which we identified 20 legitimacy crises. Our 
research approach is oriented at theory elaboration (Locke, 2001; Vaughan, 1992), as we use and 
extend institutional theory perspectives (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Scott, 2001), 
including concepts of legitimacy and legitimation strategies (Suchman, 1995) and a structurationist 
perspective on embedded agency (Giddens, 1984). We translate and extend this prior work to the 
organization level, viewing the established company as a micro-institution that both enables and 
constrains its members’ behavior.
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on embedded agency, showing how actors may 
overcome illegitimacy within a micro-institutional context by exploiting affordances of that con-
text. First, we differentiate between three types of micro-institutional affordances: heterogeneity, 
multiplicity and ambiguity, whereas existing literature typically focused on one such condition 
without clearly distinguishing them. Second, we show how radical innovators deployed four dis-
tinct strategic responses to legitimacy crises within established companies, including the strategy 
to seek tolerance, which Suchman (1995) did not identify. Our findings show how these strategic 
responses exploit different micro-institutional affordances, while also being constrained by regula-
tive, normative and cognitive elements of the micro-institutional context. Third, we find that affordances 
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are conditions of institutional structures that do not determine action; instead, the exploitation of 
such conditions is a situated accomplishment by reflexive actors, demonstrating the vital role of 
agency in realizing radical innovation.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section grounds our work in institutional literature 
on innovation and embedded agency, and introduces the notion of micro-institutional affordances. 
Next, we outline our research methods and the qualitative data analysis procedures, used in an 
iterative dialogue between (emerging) theory and empirical data. Data about 20 legitimacy crises 
that occurred in the five innovation trajectories are used to analyze the micro-institutional 
affordances enabling different strategies to transcend innovative ideas’ illegitimacy. Finally, we 
discuss how our findings contribute to institutional theory, embedded agency and the understand-
ing of radical innovation in established companies.
Theoretical Background
Innovation in micro-institutions
Organizations can be viewed as micro-institutions that involve formal structures and procedures to 
achieve organizational goals, and are also infused with values and vested interests (Elsbach, 2002). 
Moreover, they embody understandings of social reality, organizational purpose, identity and 
norms that are reproduced by organizational members (Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Ocasio, 1997; 
Selznick, 1957). Organizations as micro-institutions comprise three pillars: regulative elements 
regarding the establishment of rules, inspection of conformity to them, and sanctions to influence 
behavior; normative elements that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension in 
social life; and cultural-cognitive elements, the shared conceptions that constitute social reality and 
shape meanings (Scott, 2001; Wicks, 2001). These institutional forces align the behavior of organi-
zational agents to create enduring social structures and systems.
Recent research has investigated how innovation is both constrained and realized within organi-
zations from a micro-institutional perspective. Vermeulen, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2007) 
adopted a micro-institutional perspective to investigate why established financial services firms 
struggle with their complex incremental product innovation efforts. They examined how regula-
tive, normative and cultural-cognitive forces at the business unit level combined into institutional 
templates that either enabled or inhibited incremental product innovation processes. Unsuccessful 
projects were dominated by a ‘business as usual’ template, while successful projects deployed an 
‘innovation’ template, which discarded standard rules and procedures, isolated innovative projects 
from the organization, treated risks as part of the innovation game, and framed projects as radical 
innovations. The finding that distinctive templates exist within different business units of the same 
firm resonates with ambidextrous organizations separating radical innovation and the exploitation 
of existing businesses (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996).
Innovating actors may also find themselves pitted against existing institutional structures, 
because radical innovations often lack legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Dougherty & Heller, 
1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007). Legitimacy is a 
generalized perception or assumption that actions are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
Actions or rationales are considered legitimate when perceived to correspond with institutional 
elements. Dougherty and Heller (1994) found that product innovations in established firms fre-
quently faced legitimacy crises regarding connections of new products to firm strategies and struc-
tures, collaboration across departments, and links between technological opportunities and market 
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needs. Innovations that lack legitimacy may fail to acquire resources and be abandoned altogether 
(Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002); such crises of legitimacy demonstrate the 
constraining influence of institutions.
In this research we examine the options that actors have for responding to legitimacy problems 
(Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995), which may allow innovations to proceed 
despite initial lack of legitimacy (Dougherty & Heller, 1994). Drawing upon Oliver (1991), we 
define a strategic response as a reaction to institutional forces that is grounded in active agency and 
intended to advance particular interests. In the context of radical innovation, strategic responses by 
innovating agents are intended either to augment the legitimacy of their radical innovation ideas 
and activities or to continue with the radical innovation despite the legitimacy crisis.
Drawing on Suchman (1995), we distinguish three broad clusters of such strategic responses. 
First, conformity strategies adapt the proposed innovation to established interests, norms and 
beliefs used to evaluate the innovation. Actions and ideas thus adapted become more consistent 
with established practices, and fit better into established structures (Oliver, 1991). Second, selec-
tion strategies seek another sponsor within the larger organization who accepts the proposed inno-
vation as legitimate. Such acceptance may be based on an alternative (partly idiosyncratic) 
established set of interests, norms and beliefs. Thus, rather than conforming to the demands of an 
initial setting, actors attempt to relocate to a more friendly environmental niche where the ‘illegiti-
mate’ activities are accepted (Suchman, 1995). Third, transformation strategies introduce novel 
ideas to be incorporated into, merged with, or replace established interests, norms and beliefs of the 
organization or organizational groups (Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Suchman, 1995), thus legitimat-
ing the innovation by changing the micro-institutional context.
Institutions and agency
This paper examines how different strategic responses may emerge within an institutional context. 
Traditional interpretations of the institutional view allow little room for agents making deliberate 
choices or initiating institutional change, and predict a conformity response (Scott, 2001). More 
recent studies have explored how actors may engage in institutional work to create, maintain and 
change institutional structures (Lawrence et al., 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), and how insti-
tutional entrepreneurs emerge, accrue agency and influence change in dominant institutional struc-
tures (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). 
This stream of work confronts the paradox of embedded agency: How can actors ‘change institu-
tions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish 
to change?’ (Holm, 1995, p. 398). Resolutions to this paradox should explain that actors are neither 
‘cultural dopes’ who dumbly follow institutional templates (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 1) nor ‘dis-
embedded heroes’ who are unaffected by the environment in which they operate (Battilana et al., 
2009, p. 87).
Following several institutional theorists (e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009; 
Hardy & Phillips, 1999; Scott, 2001), we draw on structuration theory to conceptualize embedded 
agency (Giddens, 1984). First, the duality of structure implies that social structure is both the medium 
for and the consequence of action and agency. Social structure is recursively implicated in the process 
of social action: it enables and constrains action, but is also reproduced and changed through social 
action (Giddens, 1984). Whereas individual agents necessarily draw upon existing structures to act 
and make sense of the world, they are also able to act otherwise, say no and influence the social 
world, for example by enacting alternative structures. Second, reflexivity of social agents is a precon-
dition for agency within social systems. People continually monitor actions while reflecting on their 
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consequences, thus allowing for deliberate choice and agency (de Rond, 2003; Giddens, 1984). 
Through processes of reflexivity, awareness and participation in multiple institutional spheres, human 
agents can criticize, reframe and renegotiate established institutional fabrics to exercise agency, 
despite pressures for conformity in any given setting (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).
Agency may be influenced by external shocks and the social position of entrepreneurs, and also 
by institutional conditions (Battilana et al., 2009). Research in institutional theory argues that insti-
tutions can no longer be seen as monolithic, closed systems (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Townley, 
2002; Zilber, 2002). Instead they are characterized by fragmentation and internal contradictions in 
their regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements, which make them susceptible to social 
agents’ change efforts (Dorado, 2005; Greenwood, Magán Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Hargrave & 
Van de Ven, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002).
In this paper, we use the term ‘micro-institutional affordances’ to refer to those conditions of the 
institutional logics and structures within organizations that actors may exploit in strategic action. 
The notion of affordances does not refer to specific regulative, normative, or cultural-cognitive 
institutional elements, but to configurational properties among those elements (such as contradic-
tions) that allow action possibilities (see Gibson, 1979). The term ‘affordances’ is used because it 
connotes that these properties are not determinants of behavior, but must be enacted. Furthermore, 
‘affordance’ is a relational concept, indicating that these properties offer opportunities only to spe-
cific actors and strategic behaviors.
Prior studies have used multiple concepts that refer to different types of affordances – including 
contradictions (Seo & Creed, 2002), competing logics (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), heterogene-
ity (Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009) and pluralism (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009) – but have used such 
concepts rather interchangeably without theorizing similarities and distinctions, and have not 
linked different strategic actions to types of affordances. Hence, we examine strategic responses to 
legitimacy crises in radical innovation trajectories and the distinctive micro-institutional affordances 
that enable those responses. We aim to identify the most important and strongest relations between 
affordances and responses in our cases. This serves to shed light on the embedded agency of inno-
vators within the micro-institutional context of established companies.
Methods
We adopted a qualitative research approach to elaborate theory on strategic responses to crises of 
legitimacy (Strauss, 1987; Vaughan, 1992). A qualitative, inductive approach served to extend and 
refine existing categories and relationships (Locke, 2001, p. 103), such as embedded agency, types 
of strategic responses, and institutional conditions. Moreover, qualitative methods allowed us to 
examine actors’ interpretations and their enactment of strategies and affordances. The qualitative 
research procedures relied on iterative comparison and systematic coding of critical episodes along 
innovation trajectories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
Research setting
Companies and innovations were selected using a theoretical sampling logic (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), to highlight radical innovation in established firms. Two European companies were selected: 
PhemCo, operating in advanced chemicals; and Omega, an electronics company, in particular 
OmegaSys, its medical electronics division.1 These companies were selected because they are in 
dynamic industries where innovation is abundant. Further, both are established firms with a long 
history and ingrained systems of belief and behavior. Moreover, both organizations are large and 
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complex, with activities in many different countries and markets, and a variety of organizational 
units, creating differentiated micro-institutional landscapes. Finally, each organization has a long 
history in science- and technology-intensive endeavors, demonstrated in many successful products 
and several groundbreaking innovations.
Omega is one of the largest European electronics companies, with more than 110,000 employ-
ees and sales in 2009 of over €23 billion. From its origins at the end of the 19th century, Omega 
became one of the largest European producers in the nascent electrical industry. New technolo-
gies fueled a steady program of expansion and diversification, and today Omega includes over 
60 different businesses, with over 100,000 active patents worldwide. OmegaSys, a current SBU, 
provides cutting-edge equipment and technologies for the healthcare market, particularly in 
medical imaging, with acquisitions in fields like digital ultrasound systems, nuclear medicine, 
diagnostic cardiology, patient monitoring and multi-slice CT systems. Omega’s SBUs are sup-
ported by a corporate research organization (Omega Research), a corporate design agency 
(Omega Design) and a manufacturing technology organization (Omega Applied Technologies).
PhemCo, a €7 billion European chemicals company with some 20,000 employees worldwide in 
2009, ranks among the global leaders in many fields. From its beginnings as a national coal mining 
company, PhemCo diversified into nitrogen fertilizers as a by-product of its mining activities; as min-
ing ceased, PhemCo further diversified into industrial chemicals, petrochemistry, advanced synthetic 
materials and fine chemistry, and privatized, eventually being listed on the stock exchange. During 
the 1990s, PhemCo focused on products for the pharmaceutical and food industries, and advanced 
synthetic materials for the automotive and electronics industries. From the mid 1990s PhemCo pur-
sued rapid growth in life science products through acquisitions and joint ventures, and selective 
growth in sophisticated performance materials. PhemCo relies on 1300 R&D staff worldwide.
In both companies, we sought innovations that embodied technologies or technological princi-
ples new to the company and that targeted similarly novel application areas or customers, thus 
exemplifying the characteristics of radical innovations (Gatignon et al., 2002; Leifer et al., 2000). 
Such radical innovations often face issues of legitimacy requiring strategic responses (Dougherty 
& Heller, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Second, we wanted innovations where agents persisted despite 
legitimacy crises, to be able to identify necessary conditions in a processual account of how strate-
gic responses can overcome such crises (Mohr, 1982). Third, we focused on recent innovations that 
were reaching the end of R&D, in advanced prototype development, or at the beginning of market 
introduction and industrial manufacturing. Such innovation trajectories are almost complete and 
thus survived institutional hazards, yet are current enough to facilitate data access and limit both 
retrospective and outcomes biases.
Together with representatives of the CTO Office at each firm, we selected five innovations that 
matched our criteria. Three different radical technological innovations were selected for in-depth 
analysis at OmegaSys: (1) DaXo, a project on molecular medicine, which developed molecular 
diagnostics equipment for sepsis; (2) Zapim, a radically new imaging technology, based on mag-
netic particles; and (3) Icon, a novel hospital design concept for improving patients’ experience. 
Two PhemCo innovation trajectories were identified: (1) Treemax, a new class of materials based 
upon dendrimers; and (2) anti-reflective coatings based upon new nanotech principles, Reflactone 
and Reflactix. Table 1 describes these innovation trajectories.
Data collection
Data were collected primarily through interviews with key stakeholders in the radical innovation 
process. Each radical innovation involved few innovating actors, usually four to ten people, who 
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Table 1. Initial characteristics of the five investigated innovation trajectories
Project & period Description Novelty of technology Novelty of application area / 
customer base
DaXo  
2000-2006
To grow the healthcare 
division, the Board of 
OmegaSys initiates a 
research program at 
Omega Research to 
explore opportunities of 
molecular medicine. DaXo 
concerned a molecular 
diagnostics device for 
sepsis (i.e., a bacterial 
infection).
Molecular diagnostics is 
based upon principles of 
biochemistry and molecular 
biology. This differs strongly 
from OmegaSys’s existing 
competencies in electronics, 
imaging and radiation 
technology.
Application of molecular 
diagnostics technology for 
sepsis differed strongly 
from OmegaSys’s existing 
application areas like 
cardiology, oncology, or 
ultrasound, with different 
user/customer groups in 
hospitals (lab and intensive 
care instead of radiology).
Zapim  
2001-2006
Two researchers at Omega 
Research invented a novel 
magnetic particle imaging 
principle. Zapim is a 
breakthrough tomographic 
imaging method potentially 
capable of rapid dynamic 
3D imaging of magnetic 
tracer materials, promising 
high imaging sensitivity and 
low manufacturing costs.
Magnetic particle imaging 
is based upon principles 
of magnetic resonance, 
but the technological 
principle is completely 
different from existing 
MRI technology (zero-
point field), and OmegaSys 
had little experience with 
nanoparticle agents.
The application area of 
magnetic particle imaging 
was still unclear. It could be 
used and integrated with 
existing MRI or CT scanners 
and their application areas, 
or be used as real-time 
dynamic 3D imaging 
device during surgical 
interventions, opening up 
new market and application 
possibilities.
Icon  
2001-2006
Omega Design developed 
solutions at suite, 
department and hospital 
levels to enhance user 
experiences and integrate 
Omega technologies in 
healthcare. Icon solutions 
aim to improve patient 
comfort, patient contact, 
patient workflow and 
personalization.
Icon solutions build upon 
existing technologies of 
OmegaSys and Omega 
but extend this with 
user experience design 
and include architectural 
solutions for the 
environment of MRI, CT or 
X-ray scanners.
Icon solutions also target 
other customer groups 
and decision makers 
in hospitals than the 
traditional businesses of 
MRI, CT and X-ray of 
OmegaSys, and offer new 
functionalities (patient 
comfort, contact, workflow 
and personalization) to the 
market.
Treemax  
1994-2006
PhemCo Research 
invented a hyperbranched 
polymer for the Resins and 
Coatings SBU, with a highly 
functionalized surface. 
Functionalities of Treemax 
polymers enable novel 
application areas such as 
drug delivery and release, 
synthetic enzymes, and 
functional coatings.
Treemax builds upon 
PhemCo’s competencies in 
polymers and dendrimers, 
but requires new 
competencies for specific 
applications (dental, paper 
coatings, oilfield chemicals) 
that differed strongly from 
PhemCo’s competencies 
in life sciences and 
performance materials.
Treemax is a platform 
technology that can be 
applied in new areas and 
markets. The three most 
promising application 
markets (paper coatings, 
dental, and oilfield 
chemicals) were new to 
PhemCo’s traditional focus 
on life sciences and high 
performance materials.
(Continued)
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could be interviewed extensively to gain reliable insights into the innovation process. For each 
radical innovation, three to five stakeholders from different backgrounds were interviewed at 
length: at least one person from R&D (scientists, engineers); one from a marketing/business devel-
opment discipline (marketers, new business developers, sales managers); and one senior manager 
with decision-making authority (e.g., research department directors, technology strategy directors, 
corporate venturing and new business development directors). The first interviewees were sug-
gested by the CTO Offices. Other stakeholders in the innovation process mentioned during inter-
views were interviewed too, to cross-check statements and findings. Interviewing people with 
different positions and types of involvement helped offset biases or lapses (Huber & Power, 1985). 
All interviews were conducted in 2005 and 2006.
Each semi-structured interview first elicited a short summary of the main events, critical deci-
sions and conflicts of the innovation process. Next, the interview focused on issues arising from 
lack of organizational support for the innovation, resistance from organizational groups, conflicts 
over resource allocations, or debates over go/no-go decisions, as potential legitimacy crises. We 
sought details on the reasons for the resistance, conflicts or lack of support, the positions and per-
spectives of the stakeholders involved, actions to resolve issues, and rationales for actions. Our 
final questions addressed any issues previously identified in other interviews.
Interviews averaged 1.5 to 2 hours and were recorded and transcribed, producing about 600 
pages of interview text; these were corrected by interviewees. Secondary data (e.g., project propos-
als, patents, presentations, articles and strategic reports) comprised 250 additional pages. We cre-
ated a narrative reconstruction of each radical innovation, describing its main events and critical 
issues (Langley, 1999), which was validated by interviewees. These methods produced feedback 
on the data, corroboration of the observations across interviewees with different perspectives, and 
triangulated interviews with secondary data to enhance reliability and reduce individuals’ potential 
retrospective biases (Jick, 1979; Yin, 2003). Table 2 describes interviewees and their positions, and 
the other data sources consulted.
Data analysis
Within the innovation trajectories, crises were identified that threatened the projects. Building on 
Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy, events described in the interviews were coded as a 
Project & period Description Novelty of technology Novelty of application area / 
customer base
Reflactone/ 
Reflactix  
2001-2006
The Unotech SBU asked 
PhemCo Research to 
work on anti-reflective 
coatings for fiber-optic 
materials and LCD 
displays; they discovered 
a nanotech system to 
change the surface 
topology of materials with 
superior anti-reflective 
characteristics and superior 
manufacturability.
The Reflactone solution 
builds upon established 
competencies in coating 
systems at PhemCo. 
However, the knowledge 
about nanostructured 
surfaces and nanotech were 
novel to PhemCo, especially 
in this application area.
Two of the main application 
areas of the Reflactone and 
Reflactix solution platform 
were picture-frame glass 
and glass for solar panels. 
Both application areas were 
new markets for PhemCo.
Table 1. (Continued)
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legitimacy crisis when (1) lack of organizational support for a radical innovation threatened the 
project; and (2) this lack of organizational support arose from evaluations based on micro-institutional 
criteria: that is, they (a) represented established interests, norms, beliefs, definitions, procedures, 
Table 2. Interviewees and data sources
Radical innovation Interviewees Other data sources
DaXo* Dr. Abbot* – senior scientist and project 
leader (Omega Research) 
Dr. Burton – department head molecular 
medicine (Omega Research) 
Dr. Newman – business developer Daxo 
(OmegaSys) 
Dr. Greenland – senior director 
technology strategy (OmegaSys) 
Dr. Petrakis – senior director software 
technology (OmegaSys)
Company reports (2) 
Patent files (2) 
Public presentations (3)
Zapim Dr. Berkovich – senior scientist and 
project leader (Omega Research) 
Dr. Boisson – program director medical 
imaging (Omega Research) 
Dr. Popper – program director medical 
imaging (Omega Research) 
Dr. Greenland – senior director 
technology strategy (OmegaSys) 
Dr. Petrakis – senior director software 
technology (OmegaSys)
Scientific publications (2) 
Company report 
Patent file 
Project proposal 
Project portfolio matrix
Icon Dr. Eckard – marketing manager MRI 
(OmegaSys) 
Mr. Kingsley – program manager 
Healthcare (Omega Applied Tech) 
Mr. Cooper – design director Healthcare 
(Omega Design) 
Dr. Greenland – senior director 
technology strategy (OmegaSys) 
Dr. Petrakis – senior director software 
technology (OmegaSys)
Company reports (2) 
Public presentations (2) 
Project proposal
Treemax Dr. Morris – research project leader 
(Shared Research Unit) 
Dr. Sheridan – general manager 
(Treemax venture) 
Dr. Quinn – sales manager (Treemax 
venture) 
Mr. Steinbach – former director 
Corporate Venture Group (Phemco)
Company reports (3) 
Public presentations (3) 
Scientific publications (6)
Reflactone/Reflactix Dr. Coleman – senior scientist and 
project leader (Shared Research Unit) 
Dr. Hyneman – business developer 
(PhemCo) 
Mr. Steinbach – Former director 
Corporate Venture Group (Phemco)
Company reports (3) 
Public presentations (2) 
Scientific publications (3)
*All names are pseudonyms.
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rules or practices attributed to the organization or its groups; (b) were socially shared among dif-
ferent members of the organization (they were not merely personal opinions or preferences); (c) 
were perceived as obligatory (that is, individual members felt responsible to these institutionalized 
criteria). Problems that did not meet these criteria were excluded from further analysis, including 
technological problems and a lack of support arising from personal opinion of a senior manager. 
Two coders independently applied these coding rules, as well as subsequent coding procedures, to 
draw on multiple readings of all data pertaining to a crisis and to avoid premature convergence on 
particular interpretations (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Pettigrew, 1990); differences were discussed 
until consensus was reached. A total of 20 different legitimacy crises were identified across the five 
radical innovation trajectories. These legitimacy crises formed our basic unit of analysis in this 
study and were analyzed during the next phases.
A second phase of analysis involved identifying, categorizing and describing different types of stra-
tegic responses to the legitimacy crises. These responses were descriptively coded to capture the wide 
variety of strategic actions. We focused on those actions that indeed had an effect on legitimacy or 
enabled the innovators to continue with their innovation. These actions were compared across all legiti-
macy crises to identify similarities, and were initially categorized according to Suchman’s typology of 
strategic responses (conformity, selection and transformation). Closer examination revealed that not all 
actions matched Suchman’s type definitions, and an additional strategy type was defined (tolerance 
seeking). The entire dataset was then analyzed again using this more comprehensive typology.
A third phase of analysis identified and categorized micro-institutional affordances enabling the 
strategic responses to the legitimacy crises. Open coding served to identify statements in the inter-
view texts describing aspects of established micro-institutional systems and innovation character-
istics that either enabled or constrained innovators’ pursuit of a particular response. Our focus was 
on actors’ reasons for choosing a strategy, and how they interpreted their institutional setting. Axial 
coding compared the preliminary set of categories describing micro-institutional affordances 
across all interviews and strategic response types, to identify similarities across episodes and sort 
the categories of potential micro-institutional affordances and their relationships with each of the 
strategies. Selective coding refined the empirically grounded typology of relevant micro-institutional 
affordances, definitions and coding rules until saturation was achieved (Strauss, 1987). Table 3 
contains the resulting codes, definitions and illustrative interview quotes. All crises were recoded 
according to these final definitions and rules.
Findings
Figure 1 summarizes our primary findings, displaying the interactive processes between four stra-
tegic responses to legitimacy crises, the institutional context that pushes conformity, and three 
types of micro-institutional affordances that may be exploited in alternative responses. The innova-
tion’s legitimacy crisis triggers a process of reflection on micro-institutional affordances and 
options for future strategic action, which results in a situated accomplishment of a particular 
response, contingent on apparent affordances, innovation characteristics and actor embeddedness. 
Our empirical findings add tolerance seeking as strategic response to Suchman’s conformity, selec-
tion and transformation. Tolerance seeking does not alter legitimacy per se, but enables innovating 
agents to continue despite perceived illegitimacy: innovation is allowed to continue as dominant 
stakeholders who represent the micro-institutional logic – whom we term institutional actors – 
deliberately refrain from exercising their power to stop ‘illegitimate’ action.
Tables 4a to 4e show nine conformity responses in the total set of 21 responses (one crisis was 
addressed through two distinct responses). Conformity is the response predicted by traditional 
institutional theory, where institutional pressures and mechanisms foreclose agents’ options for 
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Table 3. Concepts, exemplary quotes, and definitions
Concept Exemplary quotes Definition
Conformity ‘Now we made choices to do things closer to 
PhemCo businesses, so we would have a better 
connection with the current PhemCo… And 
that is because of our [Board of Directors]. 
We didn’t choose for it ourselves… we used 
to focus only on whether it was financially 
attractive and as such we did the most exotic 
things.’ (Treemax)
Where radical innovation ideas and 
proposed actions are adapted to be 
consistent with established interests, 
norms and beliefs as used in the 
evaluation of legitimacy, the radical 
innovation exhibits conformity.
Transformation ‘We did lobby a lot, at least the people from 
Newman’s new business development team and 
also people from Research. It really is an area we 
should not miss… So much is happening, with 
very large margins, and it is closer to AlphaSys 
technology than most people think. Of course 
you have to demonstrate that this is really true. 
So we brought in people from the field, external 
experts with their stories.’ (DaXo)
Where innovating actors 
successfully introduce novel 
interests, norms and beliefs that 
better legitimate the radical 
innovation and proposed course 
of action, these are incorporated 
in, and merged with or replace 
prior established interests, norms 
and beliefs of the organization or 
its groups. As such, established 
interests, norms and beliefs adapt to 
the radical innovation.
Selection ‘It has been a quest for supporters and funds 
by Maddox and the people that believed in this 
technology. They wanted to find someone who 
understands what they are doing and who has 
access to funds. And that’s how they found me.’ 
(Reflactone)
The innovating actors seek out a 
more favorable group within the 
organization, for which the radical 
innovation and its proposed course 
of action are more legitimate. 
Selection of a more accepting locus 
moves the innovation into this 
alternative (partly idiosyncratic) 
established set of interests, norms 
and beliefs.
Seeking 
tolerance
‘So Treemax stayed alive… and we are drifting 
on this wave of innovation. But still the question 
why we are doing it, is not answered.’ ‘In 2004 
it could have crashed. But it didn’t, because it 
didn’t hurt. If we wouldn’t have enough sales to 
pay for those 2.5 people, then it certainly would 
have crashed.’ (Treemax project)
Innovating actors appeal to the 
benign neglect or tolerance of 
institutional actors for whom the 
radical innovation lacks legitimacy. 
The institutional actors deliberately 
allow the radical innovation to 
continue, despite its illegitimacy, 
requiring no adaptations to either 
the radical innovation, or to the 
established interests, norms and 
beliefs.
Ambiguity ‘We are not only a hardware company, but we 
have also worked for years with fluids in other 
technologies… a LCD display also contains 
fluids. That are also very small amounts of fluids 
and we are pretty good at that.’ (DaXo)
Institutionalized interests, norms 
and beliefs are ambiguous where 
different interpretations of 
particular institutional interests, 
norms and beliefs coexist or 
conflict; or when the meaning of 
such interests, norms and beliefs is 
vague or inconsistent.
(Continued)
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Figure 1. Micro-institutional affordances and strategic responses
Concept Exemplary quotes Definition
Multiplicity ‘So the whole innovation cycle started up 
again… Peyton [from the Board of Directors] 
also realized, hey ‘innovation’ that might be 
important to the company… and maybe we 
even want a lot of innovation, even more than 
we are doing now. And we need new areas and 
maybe we could use this Treemax in that…’ 
(Treemax)
Multiplicity refers to several 
simultaneous alternative institutional 
interests, norms and beliefs that 
coexist within the same institutional 
logic.
Heterogeneity ‘So we came to better understanding of 
the thought world of Omega Design. From 
an engineering background … that’s really 
something different. We [Omega Applied 
Technologies] focus on technical realization, 
and Design is focused on shapes and 
appearances.’ (Icon)
Heterogeneity of institutional 
context is defined as the existence 
of multiple institutional constituents 
(i.e., established organizational 
groups) within an organization 
that maintain differentiated sets of 
established interests, norms and 
beliefs (e.g. distinct SBUs).
Table 3. (Continued)
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change. Micro-institutional pressures toward conformity can strongly regulate innovators’ behav-
ior, compelling major adaptations of radical ideas, project postponement, or even cancellation, and 
thus possibly reducing the innovators’ initial enthusiasm and commitment. However, more than 
half of the legitimacy crises were addressed through alternative responses: transformation (six 
times), selection (three times) and seeking tolerance (three times). How were these alternative 
strategic responses possible when institutional theory predicts conformity?
Figure 1 displays three distinctive types of micro-institutional affordances that were exploited 
in alternatives to conformity. Heterogeneity of the institutional system refers to the presence of 
different institutional constituents within an organization, with discrete sets of established inter-
ests, norms and beliefs, based on different tasks, background or contacts (e.g., different divisions 
or departments) (see Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009, p. 39). Heterogeneity within an institutional 
system offers innovators an array of potential sponsor groups within the organization; the radical 
innovation idea may be more legitimate for some of these groups than others. Multiplicity of an 
institutional logic refers to the coexistence of multiple alternative interests, norms and beliefs 
within the same institutional logic. Multiplicity may result in inconsistent implications, similar to 
competing demands (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009), yet within a single logic. This differentiates mul-
tiplicity from heterogeneity, which concerns groups with partly idiosyncratic institutionalized log-
ics. The coexistence of alternative institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs offers innovating 
agents opportunities to manipulate or induce shifts in their ranking, or to appeal to alternatives. 
Finally, the ambiguity of micro-institutional interests, norms and beliefs offers innovating agents 
options to overcome conformity pressures and illegitimacy. Ambiguity arises where different inter-
pretations conflict or where meanings of institutional interests, norms and beliefs are vague or 
inconsistent (March & Olsen, 1976). The difference between ambiguity and multiplicity is that 
with ambiguity the meanings and interpretations are vague or inconsistent, whereas with multiplic-
ity meanings are clear, but are competing, conflicting or have inconsistent implications. Tables 4a 
to 4e display strategic responses and micro-institutional conditions for all legitimacy crises in each 
radical innovation trajectory. We explain and illustrate how each type of strategic response exploited 
a specific type of micro-institutional affordance.
Micro-institutional affordances and transformation
A major legitimacy crisis that threatened the Treemax innovation at PhemCo was overcome by a 
transformation strategy, exploiting ambiguity in the institutional context to enhance the innova-
tion’s legitimacy. In 2006, the Treemax venture team sought support from the Board of Directors 
of PhemCo and upper management of its Innovation Centre to pursue Treemax opportunities in the 
oilfield chemicals and paper chemicals markets. However, the Board of Directors had designated 
other target markets for innovation, and Treemax’s application areas did not match either future 
goals or established interests, creating a legitimacy crisis. Difficulty was exacerbated because the 
Board of Directors and the Treemax venture team were using different logics: the Treemax team 
argued from technology push and strategic fit with technological competencies, while the Board of 
Directors instead emphasized market-pull innovation in envisioning future new businesses for 
PhemCo. This deepened the legitimacy crisis because the parties used conflicting rationales and 
concepts to evaluate the Treemax innovation.
The Treemax venture team demonstrated partial conformity to some of the Board’s concerns 
(e.g., by increasing focus on application areas closer to established PhemCo businesses). More 
importantly, innovators also sought to influence upper management to redefine PhemCo in a 
broader business area, functional polymers (of which Treemax is an application). PhemCo’s 
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Table 4a. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for DaXo
Legitimacy crisis Key micro-institutional 
affordances
Strategic response
2000 Q3 Ambiguity Transformation
A new way of thinking and 
working (i.e., biology) was 
less legitimate with respect 
to the established way of 
thinking and developing 
technological solutions 
based on the dominant logic 
of physics, electronics and 
engineering.
Application of the established 
procedures and norms to the 
‘biologist’s way of working’ did 
not lead to satisfactory results, 
thus rendering ambiguous 
the applicability of established 
procedures and norms.
Adapting established ways of 
working to incorporate the novel 
‘biologist’s way of working’ gave 
the biologists more room for 
experimentation.
2003 Q1 Ambiguity Transformation
Developing a novel 
competency in biochemistry 
for DaXo is not legitimate 
with respect to OmegaSys’s 
identity as an ‘electronics’ 
company.
Paradigm changes and industry 
shifts called into question 
the consistency and fitness 
of established views of 
organizational identity.
Popularizing a new industry 
model and a pioneering role for 
the company in merging bio- and 
hardware technologies better 
legitimates the new competency.
2003 Q1 Ambiguity Transformation
Developing a novel 
competency in ‘fluids’ was 
not legitimate with respect 
to OmegaSys’s identity 
as a ‘hardware’ company, 
nor did established groups 
think that a ‘hardware’ 
company could excel in a 
‘fluids’ competency (‘we 
don’t want to get wet’). 
Thus developing this new 
competency was seen as 
high risk.
Presenting facts that question the 
established view of organizational 
identity: ‘we are not only a 
hardware company, but we have 
also worked for years with fluids 
in other technologies’.
Demonstrating the relatedness 
and familiarity of novel 
competency with past 
achievements and reframing 
organizational identity 
accordingly; further, stimulating 
novel interests by demonstrating 
the benefits of integrating the 
new competency with previously 
acknowledged competencies.
2003 Q3 Ambiguity Transformation
DaXo, a ‘diagnostic’ 
technology, is not legitimate 
in the established view of 
OmegaSys as an ‘imaging’ 
company, and does not build 
upon or directly relate to 
existing product lines.
A novel and ambiguous concept 
of the ‘total care cycle’ generates 
ongoing strategic discussions.
Adoption of the total care 
cycle redefines and extends 
OmegaSys’s potential business 
areas, to include diagnostic 
technologies.
2004 Q3 Conformity
The DaXo team’s need for 
fast, flexible and empowered 
decision making was not 
legitimate within the 
context of the established 
procedures, formalities and 
norms at OmegaSys.
Compliance with the established 
procedures and norms for budget 
approval and personnel hiring 
within the company.
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Table 4b. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Zapim
Legitimacy crisis Key micro-institutional 
affordances
Strategic response
2004 Q1 Ambiguity Transformation
Zapim as an independent 
technology and new 
business was not legitimate 
with respect to commonly 
held interpretations of 
appropriate innovation as 
only ‘variants’ of already 
existing MRI technology.
Confusion about whether the 
Zapim innovation was a variant of 
the established ‘MRI technology’ is 
used to initiate transformation.
The Zapim team popularize a 
new label, ‘imaging tracer,’ for 
particular components of the 
technology to make a clear 
distinction between the ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ technology.
2005 Q2 Conformity
Integrating Zapim with 
existing MRI technology and 
commercializing it through 
the related business unit 
was not legitimate with 
respect to established 
(‘financial performance’) 
goals and responsibilities 
of the MR business unit. 
The required investment 
in Zapim did not help the 
business unit achieve its 
performance targets in the 
short term.
The SBUs of OmegaSys in the 
end decide about the funding 
of ‘contract research’ projects. 
Integrating Zapim technology 
with existing MRI technology is 
abandoned, and the innovators 
decide to wait until a later 
stage, when technical risks 
are smaller and circumstances 
at the business unit more 
favorable.
2005 Q4 Heterogeneity Selection
Continuation with research 
and development on Zapim 
was not legitimate in the 
face of established goals 
and responsibilities (‘focus 
on high performance 
targets and core business’) 
at the Technology Office 
of OmegaSys, and did not 
match the established 
criteria and models for 
technology funding (the 
‘business potential’ logic) 
in use.
OmegaSys had multiple sales 
organizations and multiple 
business units. OmegaSys had a 
dedicated CTO Office. Omega 
had a large Research department 
with multiple research groups and 
a total of four different technology 
incubators.
After a search process an 
alternative source of funding is 
negotiated with the Research 
department itself. The idea for 
the technology development 
satisfied the funding criteria for 
a ‘lab venture,’ and matched 
Research department interests.
1500 Organization Studies 32(11) 
Table 4c. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Icon
Legitimacy crisis Key micro-institutional affordances Strategic response
2004 Q2 Conformity
Investing in Icon did not match 
with the established interests 
of senior management and 
their dominant focus on 
maximizing short-term business 
profitability and shareholder 
value.
Final decision-making authority 
for all innovation projects 
resides with the CEO and Board 
of Management of OmegaSys. 
The innovators complied with 
the concerns and established 
interests of the CEO and senior 
management and the Icon project 
was put on hold till a later stage 
and budgets were recalled.
2004 Q3 Heterogeneity Selection
Icon was not consistent 
with the established market 
approach and the value 
proposition of the existing 
business unit, and thus Icon 
was not legitimate with respect 
to its established interests and 
goals.
OmegaSys had multiple sales 
organizations and multiple business 
units. OmegaSys had a dedicated 
CTO Office. There were several 
cross business unit networks and 
cross product division networks. 
Omega consisted of several 
different product divisions and staff 
departments relevant to Icon.
After a search process, an 
alternative patron (corporate 
marketing executive/CMO) is 
found to sponsor the initiative, 
whose matching interests and 
shared view of company’s future 
rendered Icon legitimate.
2005 Q3 Conformity
The multilevel aspects of 
Icon (including hospital-level 
solutions) did not match 
established business scope 
definitions of individual 
business units, and various 
Icon components transgressed 
established business 
boundaries, responsibilities 
and interests. Thus Icon was 
illegitimate because it was not 
beneficial to the individual 
business units.
The SBUs of OmegaSys decide on 
the funding of their development 
projects and what is needed. 
Consequently, Omega Design 
adapted the radical Icon ideas 
to match individual business 
unit boundaries, scopes and 
interests. Most multilevel aspects/
components were cancelled.
2005 Q4 Conformity
The Icon ideas are based on 
‘user experiences,’ but this 
worldview is not legitimate in 
the established and dominant 
‘technology driven’ worldview 
of engineers and technical 
product developers at the high-
tech company.
Omega Design is viewed as service 
unit to the SBU clients and the 
SBUs in the end decide on funding 
development projects and decide 
on what is necessary and needed. 
Consequently, some ‘experience’-
based aspects of Icon are cancelled 
or adapted to meet technical, 
financial and timing constraints 
dictated by the dominant groups’ 
‘technology driven’ logic of 
‘engineering’ at the SBU.
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Table 4d. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Treemax
Legitimacy crisis Key micro-institutional 
affordances
Strategic response
1994 Q2 Multiplicity Tolerance seeking
Because the Treemax research project 
did not produce short-term positive 
results, it was seen as a highly uncertain 
project which did not match established 
norms for SBU R&D projects. Nor 
did it match with the business unit’s 
established interests and needs, or 
contribute to short-term business goals.
The innovation serves 
longer-term business 
interests of the SBU, 
although short-term 
research and economic 
results are not positive.
SBU management allows the 
research project to continue despite 
negative short-term results and 
misfit with established norms for 
application research projects. Part of 
the funding of the project came from 
a government R&D subsidy which 
reduced the financial burden.
1998 Q1 Conformity
Development projects for the Treemax 
technology were proposed for 
numerous promising application areas. 
These had a long-term focus, and did 
not align with established immediate 
business unit interests or issues.
The Management team of the 
SBU controls the SBU budget for 
application R&D and decides on 
funding. Consequently, the Treemax 
team adapted their plans to focus 
on only one potential application 
area better suited to the SBU. As 
such, they conformed to established 
shorter-term interests.
2001 Q3 Conformity
The dental care application of the 
Treemax technology (a low volume, 
specialty chemicals business) was not 
legitimate with respect to PhemCo’s 
identity and competencies as a ‘bulk 
chemical’ company.
The Treemax team complied with 
the concerns and cancelled the ideas 
for Treemax dental applications.
2003 Q4 Multiplicity Tolerance seeking
The Treemax venture was no 
longer legitimate with respect to the 
established interests and goals of the 
company. It was not seen as strategic or 
relevant to the longer-term strategy and 
realization of growth goals of PhemCo.
Treemax was depicted as 
strengthening the corporate 
image of ‘being an innovative 
company’ although it did not 
directly contribute to the 
growth goals of PhemCo.
The strategic relevance and fit of 
Treemax with PhemCo remain weak, 
but the Board of Directors and 
top management of the Innovation 
Centre seeking an innovation allowed 
the venture to continue.
2006 Q2 Ambiguity Transformation
The Treemax venture is not aligned 
with the longer-term strategic goals 
of PhemCo, since its target business 
areas do not match the designated 
end-markets defined by upper 
management.Treemax proponents 
reason from ‘technology push’ and 
‘fit with technological competencies,’ 
an approach that conflicted with 
the established patterns of ‘fit with 
end-markets’ and ‘market-driven 
innovation’ of upper management at 
PhemCo and its business units.
The still ambiguous but 
generally supported future 
vision for PhemCo as a 
‘specialty chemical company’ 
offers opportunities for 
transformation.
Innovative actors popularize new 
ways of thinking about the future 
vision of the company, positioning 
the Treemax venture as a prime 
example of future business models 
and competencies. As such, they 
stimulate new ways of thinking and 
new interests. Additionally:
(Continued)
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Table 4e. Overview of legitimacy crises, affordances and responses for Reflactone/Reflactix
Legitimacy crisis Key micro-institutional 
affordances
Strategic response
2002 Q4 Heterogeneity Selection
The project on anti-reflective 
coatings was illegitimate with 
respect to the established 
interests of a business unit 
focused on safeguarding their 
position in their current 
business under stress.
At Phemco multiple product 
divisions and business units were 
present and relevant to Reflactone. 
Phemco also has a dedicated 
Venturing & Business Development 
unit and a Shared Research Unit.
Search for alternative internal 
sponsors. After reframing and 
broadening the innovative idea’s 
scope and aims (repositioning 
it as a technology platform with 
many different application areas), 
it matched well with the interests 
of the Venture and Business 
Development unit, who agreed to 
sponsor the project.
2003 Q3 Conformity
One of the applications of the 
technology (‘Reflactone’) was 
not legitimate with respect 
to the established interests of 
PhemCo because it offered high 
risks, little growth opportunity 
and few synergies with 
established businesses.
After extensive analysis of the 
business potential of Reflactone 
in the electronic display market, 
the innovators agreed to meet 
the interests and concerns of the 
Board of PhemCo and licensed 
Reflactone out to a former 
technology partner.
2005 Q4 Multiplicity Tolerance seeking
The Reflactix application 
(selling glass with anti-reflective 
coating) was not legitimate with 
respect to PhemCo’s identity of 
a ‘chemicals’ company. Reflactix 
did not match with established 
interests of existing business 
units of PhemCo. It has little fit 
and low synergy with existing 
businesses of the company.
Reflactix strengthens the 
corporate image of ‘being an 
innovative company’ although 
it does not fit with existing 
businesses of PhemCo. Moreover, 
the innovation might become 
strategic in the future.
Although Reflactix remained 
‘strange’ with respect to 
established views of PhemCo’s 
identity, and had little synergy and 
fit with established businesses, 
upper management decided to 
allow the innovation to continue. 
Low investments were needed 
to set up the pilot plant and the 
potential rewards could be high.
Legitimacy crisis Key micro-institutional 
affordances
Strategic response
 Conformity 
The Board of Directors of PhemCo 
pushed the Treemax team to 
align their plans better. The Board 
had decision-making power and 
controlled the budgets for new 
strategic initiatives. Consequently, 
the Treemax team adapted their 
business plans to improve alignment 
with the established and designated 
end-markets of PhemCo and their 
typical customer needs.
Table 4d. (Continued)
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espoused strategic goal, to move from bulk chemicals to specialty chemicals, favored more innova-
tive, tailored products with higher profit margins. However, the Board was vague about what 
‘becoming a specialty chemical company’ actually meant. The Treemax team showcased Treemax 
as an exemplar of specialty chemicals, a novel business model offering new revenue streams. The 
Treemax team embedded new perspectives and redefined interests into the existing micro-institutional 
logic to legitimize their radical innovation ideas. This response can be characterized as a transfor-
mation strategy.
Treemax business developer Sheridan described the circumstances that enabled a transforma-
tion strategy, emphasizing the role of ambiguity, as follows:
So you can’t escape the question how to proceed in the future? What is its raison d’ètre, why should we 
do it? The business model is that we have a product-technology platform and we should bring it to the 
market. And then we see clear examples in the industry that do just that, and those are the specialty 
polymer companies. And we have as an ambition to realize that for PhemCo in the next five or ten years. 
We see the Treemax technology as a valuable component in this process … And PhemCo has stated in its 
2005 and 2010 strategy that we want to be a specialty company. Well, what does that mean? And we are 
currently shaping and filling this in. Because these are not precise directives from the top, no, these are just 
broad guidelines in the end …. Slowly people start to realize that a specialty business consists of connecting 
and combining smaller clusters of revenues of product/market combinations in a very smart way … instead 
of what we are used to do in the coal and mining business, or petrochemical business, or the nylon business.
Sheridan’s comments articulate a new vision of PhemCo as a specialty chemical company, making 
concrete an idea that was previously vague and unspecific, although supported by dominant groups 
and mentioned in PhemCo’s formal strategic plans and goals. The open-ended ambiguity of 
PhemCo’s vision enabled innovators to portray Treemax and functional polymers as exemplary 
templates for becoming a specialty chemicals company, thereby redefining PhemCo’s future in 
terms of Treemax capabilities.
Ambiguity enabled the Treemax team to transform institutionalized visions, redefining an 
accepted idea by linking it to their radical innovation, to significantly augment their venture’s 
legitimacy. Widely shared but loosely defined ideas about organizational identity and established 
strategic roles allowed innovators to translate the notion of ‘a specialty chemicals company’ into 
Treemax’s situation, to offer alternative institutional models, and initiate transformation. The 
meaning of prevailing institutional interests, norms and beliefs was vague, implicit and open to 
multiple interpretations – in other words, ambiguous (March & Olsen, 1976). Such ambiguity 
affords innovating agents opportunities to influence established micro-institutional structures and 
logics to the benefit of radical innovation ideas.
Micro-institutional affordances and selection
A major legitimacy crisis affecting the Reflactone innovation project, pursued by the Shared 
Research Unit of PhemCo, illustrates the selection strategy to seek more favorable oases within a 
heterogeneous institutional setting. PhemCo Unotech SBU sponsored a research project that iden-
tified interesting growth opportunities for Reflactone. However, an economic downturn in 
Unotech’s primary business led to elimination of all activities not directly contributing to immedi-
ate survival, and Reflactone’s mismatch with both established interests and immediate urgencies of 
the business unit generated a legitimacy crisis in 2002.
In response, the director of the Shared Research Unit, Dr. Maddox, actively searched for 
new sponsors within PhemCo. He found a backer in the director of PhemCo’s Venturing and 
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Business Development Group (V&BD), Mr. Steinbach, who saw Reflactone as a very promis-
ing potential contributor to a specialty chemicals future. However, Steinbach was not willing 
to fund the project’s initially limited focus on anti-reflective coatings for display applications. 
When Maddox explained that Reflactone could support all kinds of functional coating systems 
with many different properties and potential applications, some closely related to existing 
PhemCo businesses, this broader focus matched very well with the ambitions of Steinbach and 
the V&BD group. Maddox’s search for new sponsors within PhemCo is an example of a selec-
tion strategy.
A closer look reveals characteristics of the micro-institutional context and the innovators’ posi-
tions that enabled a selection strategy. Maddox, director of the Shared Research Unit (SRU), 
enjoyed easy access to a variety of organizational groups. As Steinbach noted:
It has been a quest for supporters and funds by Maddox and the people who believed in this technology. 
They wanted to find someone who understands what they are doing and who has access to funds. And 
that’s how they found me. And I must say, I can get along very well with Maddox. We agree on a lot of 
things… And he is a great guy, a real gentleman, who really has a vision and is determined.
As director of SRU, Maddox was responsible for most research activities within PhemCo (both 
contract research for the different business units and exploratory research projects), so he main-
tained working relationships with all SRU research groups, with development groups at the prod-
uct divisions and business units, with management teams of the business units, and with the 
corporate planning staff as well as the PhemCo Innovation Centre, representing an array of multi-
ple and diverse potential sponsors. The existence of diverse groups and networks within an organi-
zation supports selection strategies: PhemCo business units operate in very different industries and 
deploy distinctive technology platforms, each with their own experiences and identities (e.g., 
Unotech’s Coatings and Resins, and the Performance Materials SBU, as well as the SRU). PhemCo 
even has a specific business unit (the V&BD group) supporting novel business and technology 
initiatives. This multitude of organizational groups sustained differentiated (and partly idiosyn-
cratic) sets of micro-institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs, offering innovating actors many 
alternative sponsors to select.
Micro-institutional affordances and tolerance seeking
Tolerance-seeking strategies amount to finding a niche of benign neglect where progress can con-
tinue despite a legitimacy crisis. The Reflactone innovators encountered a further legitimacy crisis 
when, at a later stage, they proposed a novel business model, an example illuminating the dynam-
ics of micro-institutional circumstances and innovators’ actions to maneuver their radical innova-
tion into a tolerant pocket of their micro-institutional system.
After the Reflactone research team developed an anti-reflective coating system for glass, they 
advocated commercialization by PhemCo applying the anti-reflective coating on pre-manufactured 
glass themselves. This approach was expected to increase profit margins significantly, compared to 
selling or licensing out the anti-reflective coating. However, this would be a completely new busi-
ness model for PhemCo, moving the company up the value chain in a new business and new mar-
ket, based on a novel technology. In 2005 this resulted in a conflict between different views of 
organizational identity and a poor fit with existing interests of PhemCo’s established business. As 
Dr. Hyneman, a business developer, noted:
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PhemCo is not used to this type of business. It is very strange that a chemical company would handle glass 
now. That is something weird.
The idea of selling glass conflicted with the established view of what PhemCo as a chemical com-
pany is and does, its organizational identity. Since PhemCo’s established businesses centered on 
producing and selling chemical raw materials (e.g., coatings) in business-to-business markets, the 
new business model was perceived to be a strategic misfit, with limited synergy with PhemCo’s 
established businesses.
People at PhemCo and the Innovation Centre still considered selling glass a misfit with the 
established corporate identity, and major doubts about this strategic extension remained. The Innovation 
Centre management ultimately allowed the Reflactone team to proceed, despite the unresolved 
legitimacy crisis however, since both the Centre and the Board also wanted to demonstrate 
PhemCo’s ability to innovate beyond its established footprint. We characterize this response as a 
tolerance seeking strategy, where innovating actors appeal to mixed institutionalized interests and 
beliefs, even though their course of action is not fully legitimate within the prevailing micro-
institutional logic.
The multiplicity of micro-institutional interests and beliefs supported the innovators’ tolerance-
seeking strategy. Reflactone’s project leader described it as follows:
There are two reasons for [letting the Reflactone team continue with their plans] I think … The first one 
that I am pretty sure about is that PhemCo’s history of successfully commercializing its own technology 
in new markets is fairly limited. In the last 20 years, if you look at the new products in performance 
materials I can think of two or three … So, three new products in 20 years. So there is a real commitment 
of top management to show to our investors that we are capable of doing new stuff.
Despite the conflict, top management was eager to demonstrate PhemCo’s innovation capability 
to its shareholders. Thus, different goals and beliefs coexisted (and competed) within the same 
micro-institutional logic. Innovators can exploit this multiplicity to shift preferences, altering the 
hierarchy of established goals and beliefs to favor innovation. Here, illegitimate actions are 
allowed to continue because innovation can be advocated in view of long-term goals, albeit at the 
expense of short-term consistency. Actors representing the mainstream micro-institutional logic 
can reasonably conclude that full consistency with some important established interests and 
beliefs would contradict others. Innovating agents can appeal to this multiplicity, encouraging 
institutional actors to trade off different interests or rank them differently, justifying tolerance of 
(partly) illegitimate actions.
Enacting affordances and selecting responses
The previous sections explained how strategic responses are enabled by enacting particular types 
of micro-institutional affordances. Tables 4a to 4e display two intriguing phenomena that call for 
further explanation. First, multiple strategic responses were used at different moments within a 
single innovation trajectory, but there is no apparent pattern in the sequence of strategies over 
time. Second, this variety of strategic responses is even larger within the same organization: all 
strategic responses were observed at PhemCo, and all responses, except seeking tolerance, were 
found at OmegaSys. But why did those involved in different radical innovation projects in the 
same company, or even within the same project, enact their micro-institutional environment in 
such different ways?
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First, affordances are content-specific and must be enacted in strategic responses; they are not 
causal drivers nor generically available resources for any issue of legitimacy. Ambiguity, heteroge-
neity and multiplicity arise from specific institutionalized norms and beliefs that may be relevant 
for one legitimacy crisis, but not for another. Moreover, actors must perceive these affordances and 
envision their potential relevance to enact them. This relevance may differ from legitimacy crisis 
to legitimacy crises because rather distinct crises emerged over time, exhibiting the unpredictable 
nature of innovation journeys (see Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999). For exam-
ple, the DaXo project at OmegaSys resolved its first four legitimacy crises through transformation 
responses, exploiting different ambiguities, some of which were purposefully created. Developing 
a competency in ‘biochemistry’ was illegitimate within OmegaSys as an ‘electronics’ firm, so 
innovating actors ambiguated this organizational identity, by pointing out how other ‘electronics’ 
firms were blurring those boundaries. In another crisis, Omega’s ‘imaging company’ identity was 
constraining, so the novel and still ambiguous concept of the ‘total care cycle’ was used to initiate 
transformation. Thus, ambiguity may concern different aspects of the micro-institutional environ-
ment; a particular ambiguity does not pertain to every legitimacy crises. For the last legitimacy 
crises faced by DaXo, no ambiguity or any other affordance could be exploited, and a conformity 
response was chosen instead. An intrinsic connection between affordances and responses needs to 
be crafted for every crisis in each innovation trajectory.
Second, enactment of affordances and selection of responses also depend on innovation charac-
teristics, including resource impact, scope and radicalness. These characteristics may be purpose-
fully adjusted to enable seeking tolerance, selection or conformity responses; a successful 
transformation strategy most often preserved the original radical innovation ideas. Relatively low 
resource impact of a radical innovation encourages innovating actors to seek (and institutional 
actors to grant) institutional tolerance, because resources need not be withdrawn from other initia-
tives. Although Treemax had little fit with established interests and strategy of PhemCo, the inno-
vation team resolved their fourth legitimacy crisis by appealing to the multiplicity of established 
interests to seek tolerance and by cutting back the required budget for Treemax considerably. As 
Dr. Sheridan, general manager of Treemax, stated:
So if you want to know how I solved it? By disappearing under the blanket and putting down the 
performance. Just trim down and show them that we are right. And what happened is that we went back 
from 10 to about three employees… and we have proven something in only one market segment during 
that year, and the rest we kept alive, literally.
Low resource impact favors innovators’ use of multiplicity to seek tolerance because it does not 
force trade-offs against other projects. Resource impact is partially adjustable; innovators can 
reduce resource impact to expand opportunities for tolerance within a micro-institutional regime.
Further, a radical innovation’s scope is related to its potential appeal: narrowly construed innova-
tions will appeal to fewer constituencies, while more broadly defined innovations potentially interest 
more institutional sponsors. Consequently, the apparent heterogeneity accessible to innovators to over-
come a legitimacy crisis depends on the scope of the innovation itself. Sometimes innovators must 
reframe their radical innovation idea to highlight its match with alternative, more diverse institutional 
subgroups’ interests. Steinbach mentioned this response in one of the interviews on Reflactone:
There was some kind of dream that if we, as a specialty company of the future, could put very thin layers 
on all kinds of materials so that you could still see through the material, and that we could also add unique 
properties to it, then we are doing the right thing for the new PhemCo. And then I said I want to fund this 
research from the Venturing and Business Development group, because I really think this is an opportunity… 
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and I see this much broader than only anti-reflection. … [the ideas to broaden the scope] existed already. 
Also Maddox had thought extensively about it. But you know that when you work in a large company, you 
should not come up with too fuzzy concepts, because these usually don’t stand a chance. But you have to 
keep them at hand, so that you can play that card at the right moment.
Broadening Reflactone’s scope into multiple application areas aligned it with the V&BD unit’s 
interests; a more narrowly focused application scope clearly held appeal for fewer institutional 
subgroups.
Finally, some strategic responses adapt the radicalness of an innovation. In particular, con-
formity responses required that plans and ideas were adapted to better match established logics 
and structures. None of the conformity responses that were observed abandoned the project alto-
gether; instead they changed ideas into something less radical than initially envisioned, to enable 
innovators to continue with some of their innovative ideas. Omega Design developed the Icon 
concept to include design solutions and technologies at room, department and hospital levels to 
improve patients’ experiences throughout the whole healthcare process. Because Icon’s multi-
mode approach transgressed traditional boundaries of MR and CT systems, it did not make sense 
to the OmegaSys business units, nor did Icon fit into any of their existing systems. The resulting 
legitimacy crisis, in 2005, threatened the further development of Icon, because SBUs were not 
willing to fund this project. Failing to convince the division marketing management to create a 
new organizational group for department- and hospital-level Icon solutions, Omega designers 
eventually decided to accommodate to the existing interests and boundary definitions of the 
SBUs. They focused on developing discrete Icon options for the MR suite and for the CT suite, 
abandoning multilevel Icon solutions that targeted other customer groups and decision makers in 
hospitals. Thus, Icon’s innovators adapted their ideas to the established logic and structures, over-
coming their legitimacy crisis by conformity. As long as the innovation is not compromised too 
much, conformity also supports the larger institutional frame, in return for legitimacy and support 
from established institutional groups.
Third, the enactment of affordances is facilitated by the social position of innovating actors (see 
Battilana, 2006), and their social skills (see Fligstein, 1997). Some actors see what others cannot; 
some communicate better than others; others still are better in maneuvering in political space or 
develop better ideas to adapt their innovation. Some of the differences in responses between (and 
within) projects in the same firm can be explained by differences in the social positions of the 
innovating actors involved in those projects. The Treemax team had a boundary spanning position 
within PhemCo that rendered them more aware and critical of ambiguity. As a relatively independ-
ent venture unit (supported by PhemCo’s Innovation Centre), innovators were loosely coupled to 
the rest of the PhemCo organization, and active in a novel business field. Thus, the Treemax team 
was more receptive to alternative opportunities than insiders wedded to PhemCo’s prior busi-
nesses. Similarly, exploiting heterogeneity of an institutional system to find alternative sponsors is 
easier for innovating agents occupying boundary-spanning positions, who are exposed to multiple 
subgroups and have extensive networks providing access to alternative viewpoints and information 
(Tushman & Scanlan, 1981).
The difference between the response to the second and third Zapim legitimacy crises can be 
explained by the power of an internal sponsor, who had come to support the project in the mean-
time. The second legitimacy crisis was resolved by a conformity strategy, while the third legiti-
macy crisis was overcome by a selection response. During the second crisis, the innovation team 
working on the Zapim technology lobbied for support from the SBU MRI for which they nor-
mally work. The small innovation team, a young project leader and two senior scientists relatively 
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new to the company, was unable to gain support from the MRI SBU, but their limited organiza-
tional network offered few options. By the time of the third legitimacy crisis, the head of their 
research department supported Zapim and leveraged his good connections with both the CTO 
Office of OmegaSys and within Omega Research itself for alternative sources of funding and 
organizational support.
Every enactment of an affordance to enable a strategic response to a legitimacy crisis is a situ-
ated accomplishment, crafting an intricate connection between what is at stake in the legitimacy 
crises and the specific content of the affordance. This accomplishment involves shaping innovation 
characteristics and depends on innovating actors’ social positions and skills. As a consequence, 
different affordances are enacted and different responses are pursued to overcome legitimacy cri-
ses, even within the same project or the same organization.
Discussion and Conclusion
Established institutional logics and structures are relatively stable over time and exert constrain-
ing effects on innovating agents, but they also provide potential resources to overcome legiti-
macy problems associated with radical innovation. Vermeulen et al. (2007) found that regulatory, 
normative and cultural-cognitive forces combined into distinct institutional templates that were 
either conducive or inhibitive to incremental service innovations; and Dougherty and Heller 
(1994) observed how radical innovations were at odds with existing institutional templates. But 
we find that the institutional forces that render radical innovation as illegitimate, at the same 
time offer affordances that can be exploited to advance actions not initially countenanced as 
legitimate. Our empirical findings on such micro-institutional affordances explain why and how 
a variety of strategic responses to overcome legitimacy crises can arise within a single micro-
institutional system.
First of all, our findings offer a differentiated perspective on conditions that may be exploited in 
strategic responses to legitimacy crises. Our analysis of strategic responses confirms the insight 
from institutional theory that institutional forces push innovating actors toward conformity (Scott, 
2001). A central tenet of our findings, however, is that heterogeneity, multiplicity and ambiguity 
afford alternative paths for those pioneering radical innovations. A heterogeneous institutional 
context provides an array of differentiated institutionalized groups, for some of whom the radical 
innovation idea may be more legitimate, thus enabling a selection strategy. The multiplicity of 
institutional interests, norms and beliefs constitutes an array of conflicting demands, enabling 
innovating actors to appeal to those demands best corresponding to their radical innovation and 
seek tolerance for its lack of correspondence with other institutional demands. Ambiguity of micro-
institutional interests, norms and beliefs offers innovating agents opportunities to propagate novel 
interpretations, transforming the institutional system to favor the innovation. Other scholars have 
used a range of related concepts (e.g., Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009) 
but without explicitly differentiating them. Thus, we provide a more comprehensive and differenti-
ated perspective on conditions for agency within institutional systems. Moreover, whereas the 
institutional literature has identified conditions that support agency in general (e.g., Battilana & 
d’Aunno, 2009), we identify connections between specific affordances and distinct strategies to 
overcome pressures toward stability. These connections should not be interpreted as deterministic 
or causal links between affordance and response, but rather are both part of a dynamic process of 
reflection and action triggered by a legitimacy crisis. Neither are these connections exclusive; we 
have identified the strongest links between affordances and strategies, but more than one affordance 
can be enacted and elements of more than one type of strategy may be combined or deployed 
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consecutively during an interactive and iterative process. The response to the last legitimacy crisis 
of Treemax, for example, showed how transformation and conformity were combined.
Second, our findings contribute to an enhanced understanding of embedded agency as called for 
in recent publications (Lawrence et al., 2009). Whereas the institutional entrepreneurship literature 
has been criticized for over-voluntaristic assumptions regarding agency (Battilana et al., 2009), our 
analysis shows that innovating actors were not ‘disembedded heroes,’ but highly contextualized 
actors. Building upon the structurationist concepts of duality of structure and reflexivity, we argue 
instead that actors’ agency was enabled by their embeddedness. Ambiguity, heterogeneity and mul-
tiplicity are properties of structure as a medium of action, while strategic responses also (re)pro-
duce or change this structure. Each of these affordances enables a broader repertoire of actions: 
ambiguity offers multiple interpretations to draw upon; heterogeneity offers multiple constituents 
to appeal to; and multiplicity offers multiple beliefs and norms with potentially contrasting impli-
cations. The embeddedness of innovating actors allows them to exploit these affordances to gener-
ate action alternatives. These findings illustrate that institutionally embedded agency has generative 
potential.
Further, we find that affordances are enacted by embedded agents with reflexive capabilities 
(Giddens, 1984). Micro-institutional affordances are not exogenous or inert, exerting causal influ-
ence over social agents, but instead properties of the micro-institutional system as enacted by 
reflexive actors, and thus endogenous to the process of responding to legitimacy crises. Legitimacy 
crises trigger reflexivity because they force actors to reflect upon the situation of their innovation 
activities in the institutional environment. The experience of inconsistency in institutional ele-
ments may further trigger reflexivity (see Seo & Creed, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). This 
reflexivity, in turn, is critical because innovating actors must envision the opportunities offered by 
conditions of their institutional context, and be aware of implications for their innovation activities 
and purposefully adjust them. Moreover, they may construe conditions that afford continuation of 
their innovation activities by ambiguating institutionalized norms and beliefs; by emphasizing 
multiplicity to seek tolerance, or by selecting heterogeneity relevant for the innovation issues at 
stake. Reflexivity is thus endogenous to the processes of embedded agency in the face of a legiti-
macy crisis, because reflexivity is triggered by such a crisis but is also a necessary condition to 
craft a situated response to it.
The connections between strategic responses and micro-institutional affordances uncovered in 
our study are likely to depend on the aspirations of actors. Actors in our study were primarily con-
cerned with continuing their radical innovation trajectory. For them, heterogeneity offered oppor-
tunities to select a corner of the institutional context more supportive of their innovation. Yet, in 
other studies, the presence of competing demands from multiple institutional constituents has been 
presented as a dilemma to be overcome (see Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009). 
Similarly, whereas Oliver (1991) argued that environmental uncertainty stimulates organizations to 
conform to established institutional logics, our findings suggest that ambiguity provides opportuni-
ties for transformation. Innovating actors do not seek to avoid uncertainty, but rather to identify and 
exploit it in order to proceed with their innovation. Thus, the role of the affordances identified in 
our study may depend on the objectives of the actors involved. This suggests that one way forward 
for recent work on the repertoire of institutional work (Battilana & d’Aunno, 2009; Lawrence 
et al., 2009) is to examine how alternative objectives affect how embedded agents can exploit 
affordances.
Finally, our findings raise challenging issues for the management of innovation. Can institu-
tional templates ever be as supportive for radical innovation as Vermeulen et al. (2007) found for 
incremental service innovation? The radical projects investigated were embedded in experienced 
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organizations with espoused commitment to radical innovation and dedicated organizational struc-
tures; yet these projects faced threats because they did not fit with widely shared beliefs, norms and 
interests. This suggests that structures can only be part of the solution to enable radical innovation, 
to be complemented by the agency of innovating actors. Novel concepts proposed in innova-
tion management literature, such as ambidextrous organizations that separate exploratory inno-
vation and exploitation of current businesses (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), may be beneficial by 
creating heterogeneity and ambiguity, but agency is essential to enact and leverage such affordances 
and make innovation happen.
A limitation of this study is that it is largely retrospective, which may limit the accuracy and 
completeness of data, in particular on reflective processes from the early phases of the innovation 
histories. Real-time investigation of radical innovation trajectories may extend the present study by 
exploring how strategic responses are crafted over time and interact with the interpretation and 
re-interpretation of micro-institutional affordances. Another limitation that calls for further research 
is that we only examined projects and instances where legitimacy crises were overcome to uncover 
how successful strategic responses were possible (see Mohr, 1982). Future research on failed pro-
jects and unsuccessful attempts to overcome legitimacy crises may provide complementary theo-
retical insight. Moreover, future research may also revisit incremental innovation to examine 
whether similar dynamics may be found in case incremental innovation runs into legitimacy 
crises.
The central question in our study has been how does radical technological innovation take place 
successfully within established institutional systems. Our findings show that existing institutional 
structures may pose constraints to radical innovation projects, even within organizations experi-
enced in innovation. Although the search for more effective structures should not be discouraged, 
our findings point at the complementary and vital role of human agency in the pursuit of radical 
innovation. Moreover, this paper showed how embedded agency is possible because of affordances 
within institutional structures. Thus, this paper extends institutional theory toward a micro-
institutional perspective on radical innovation, providing a robust explanation of both institutional 
stability and radical change.
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